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Any trust situation involves a certain amount of risk for trustors that trustees could abuse. In some cases, intermediaries exist who
play a crucial role in the exchange by providing reputational information. To examine under what conditions intermediary opinion
could have a positive impact on cooperation, we designed two experiments based on a modified version of the investment game
where intermediaries rated the behaviour of trustees under various incentive schemes and different role structures. We found that
intermediaries can increase trust if there is room for indirect reciprocity between the involved parties. We also found that the effect
of monetary incentives and social norms cannot be clearly separable in these situations. If properly designed, monetary incentives
for intermediaries can have a positive effect. On the one hand, when intermediary rewards are aligned with the trustor’s interest,
investments and returns tend to increase. On the other hand, fixed monetary incentives perform less than any other incentive
schemes and endogenous social norms in ensuring trust and fairness. These findings should make us reconsider the mantra of
incentivization of social and public conventional policy.
1. Introduction
A trust relationship is an exchange where at least two parties
interact, that is, a trustor and a trustee, and in which there is a
certain amount of risk for the former. If the trustor decides to
place trust, the trustee can honour or abuse it. If honouring
trust is costly, as what happened in one-shot interactions and
sometimes even in repeated exchanges, the trustee will have
no rational incentive to be trustworthy. Knowing this, the
trustor is hardly likely to make the first move [1].
Understanding how trust can be established in such hos-
tile situations is of paramount importance. One of the most
interesting sociological explanations suggests that social and
economic exchanges are embedded in social contexts where
certain norms and roles have evolved to mediate between
individual interests. For instance, intermediaries might act as
advisories and mediators between the parties involved and
reputation or gossip can help to spread information about
unknown partners that helps trustors to take the risk of inter-
action [1–3].
Recent experimental results have shown that individuals
can overcome distrust and cooperate more frequently if
behaviour in the exchange is observed by a third party [4–
8]. This happens even when the opinion of a third party has
no consequence on the payoffs of the individuals and repu-
tational building strategies are ruled out [9]. This indicates
that, in many real situations, third parties can reduce infor-
mation asymmetry and temptations of free riding, induce
mutual trust, and ensure collective benefit. This requires
understanding why and under which conditions information
from third parties should be trusted by trustors and what
type of incentives canmake judgements or recommendations
by third parties credible to the eyes of trustors. Indeed,
first, intermediaries’ opinion is often subjective. Secondly,
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it is formulated on trustee’s past behaviour in situations
where the trustees could have strategically mimicked trust-
whorty signals in view of benefits from future trustors. This
transforms the problem of trust in a “secondary problem
of trust” [10]. Here, the challenge is to understand under
what conditions, in anonymous exchanges with unknown
partners, intermediaries could be considered reliable and
how they should be motivated to provide information that
increases trust.
For instance, let us consider certain important social
and economic interactions, such as the trust relationships
between employees and managers in big companies or
between two potential partners for a relationship. In these
cases, intermediaries are called on to express their opinion
on certain attributes or behaviour, which are crucial to create
trust. Sometimes they do so voluntarily, without receiving any
material payoffs, such as someone recommending a friend as
a partner to another friend. In other cases, intermediaries are
financially motivated professionals, such as an HR manager
recommending an employee to be upgraded to his/her
company manager. Therefore, while in certain spheres of
social life, the social function of intermediaries has been
institutionalized through material incentives and roles, in
other situations informal or voluntary norms have developed.
The aim of our paper was to examine these trust problems
in triadic relations (i.e., between trustors, intermediaries,
and trustees) to better understand conditions that could
transform the intermediary opinion in a trust carrier. We
conducted two experiments where subjects played amodified
version of the repeated investment game with intermediaries
added to the typical trustor/trustee dyadic relation. We
manipulated incentives and roles of intermediaries to test
their impact on cooperation in particularly hostile condi-
tions. For this, we meant a situation where (i) intermediaries
formulated their opinion on the trustee behaviour on a lim-
ited set of information and (ii) their opinion was not public
and (iii) did not have long-term consequences on thematerial
payoffs of the trustees. In this situation, intermediaries had
only a limited set of information (i) and bad standing was not
so risky for trustees (ii-iii). Hence, our experimental situation
was intentionally designed so that intermediary opinion was
poorly credible for trustors. We examined the importance of
indirect reciprocity considerations and their interplay with
material incentives and social norms. Furthermore, we tested
different ways to align intermediary’s incentives, for example,
respectively, with the trustors’ or the trustees’ interests, and
the impact of roles’ rotation.
We compared results from two laboratory experiments
Experiment 1, first reported in [11], and Experiment 2,
previously unpublished. The latter was designed to carefully
examine the effect of indirect reciprocity on the behaviour
of intermediaries—and, more generally, on trust at the
system level—since this mechanism was crucial in the first
experiment. The rest of the paper introduces our research
background and hypotheses (Section 2), presents the design
of the two experiments (Section 3) and their outcomes
(Section 4), and finally discusses certain social and policy
implications of the results (Section 5).
2. Hypotheses
While dyadic embeddedness is important to explain trust
and cooperation in situations involving stable relationships
between two actors, inmodern society trust is oftenmediated
by agents who facilitate the exchange between trustors and
trustees when they cannot rely on past experience [1, 12, 13].
Important examples of this have been empirically found in
the development of trust between suppliers and customers in
a variety of situations, such as in electronic markets on the
web [14, 15] and in theUS venture capitalmarket [16]. In these
cases, any chance for trust is undermined by information
asymmetry between the involved parties and does not simply
imply all-none choices, such as trusting or not, but requires a
pondered rational calculus of trust investment.
Let us consider the investment game, a typical framework
to model trust problems [17]. First, Player A (the trustor)
receives an initial endowment of 𝑑A points, with a fixed
exchange rate in real money. Then, A is called to decide the
amount 𝐼 between 0 and 𝑑A to send to Player B (the trustee),
keeping the part (𝑑A − 𝐼). The amount sent by A is multiplied
by 𝑚 > 1 and added to B’s own endowment 𝑑B. (Note that
in some investments games, including [17], B players had
no endowment; that is, 𝑑B = 0. Trustor investments tend
to be lower in experiments where 𝑑B > 0 [18].) Then, B is
called to decide the share of the amount received (plus his/her
endowment) to return toA. As before, the amount𝑅 returned
byB can be between 0 and (𝑑B+𝑚𝐼).The amount not returned
represents B’s profit, while 𝑅 is summed to the part kept by A
to form his/her final profit. Therefore, the player’s profit is as
follows:
𝑃A = 𝑑A − 𝐼 + 𝑅,
𝑃B = 𝑑B + 𝑚𝐼 − 𝑅.
(1)
The structure of the game implies that the trustor can have
an interest in investing on condition that the expected returns
are higher than his/her own investments, that is, if𝑅 = 𝑞(𝑑B+
𝑚𝐼) > 𝐼, where 𝑞 is the proportion returned by the trustee.
However, as the trustor can rationally presume that the
trustee has no interest in returning anything, it is rationally
expected that the trustor will not invest and trust will not
be placed, giving rise to a suboptimal collective outcome of
(𝑑A + 𝑑B) while the social optimum (𝑚𝑑A + 𝑑B) could have
been reached with sufficient high levels of trust. However,
empirical evidence contradicts this prediction. A recent
review of 162 experimental replications of the investment
game indicated that, on average, trustors invested about 50%
(range 22–89%) of their endowment and trustors returned
37% (range 11–81%) of their amount [18].
In this type of games, the crucial challenge is to under-
stand the mechanisms through which the trustor estimates
the trustworthiness of the trustee by using available infor-
mation. Following Coleman [1], we can identify two possible
information sources for trustors: (i) direct knowledge of
past behaviour of the trustee and (ii) knowledge of trustee
behaviour obtained by a third party with positions and
interest differently aligned to those of the other parties
involved. In both cases, information on past behaviour of
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the trustee may help the trustor in predicting the trustwor-
thiness of the trustee, creating in turn reputational incentives
for the trustee to overcome any temptation of cheating in view
of future benefits.
While it is widely acknowledged that knowing the past
behaviour of a trustee can increase a trustor’s investment
and cooperation in dyadically embedded interaction [19–23],
the case of triadic relations is more interesting as these
relationships can compensate for the lack of direct knowledge
and contacts between actors, so enlarging the social circles
and the extent of the exchange [24]. This requires us to
understand the complex triangulation of the exchange and
especially the role of trust intermediaries, who might have
either analogous or different positions and interests to the
trustors. When positions and interests between the trustor
and the intermediary are aligned, the intermediary can act
in the trustor’s interest and the latter seriously considers the
intermediary’s opinion so that his/her decision will reflect the
available reputational information. When the intermediary
and the trustor do not have aligned interests, the outcome of
the exchange is heavily dependent on the motivations behind
the intermediary’s action [1].
In order to represent triadic relations in trust situations,
we modified the standard investment game framework by
adding to the trustor (called Player A) and the trustee (called
Player B) a third player, that is, the intermediary (called Player
C). We assumed that the intermediary could observe B past
behaviour (i.e., the amount of returns sent to A compared
to the A investment) and was called to decide whether to
provide A with honest and accurate information or not. If
credible to the eye of A, information by C is expected to
help A regulate his/her investment. If this is so, B Players
have a rational interest in building a good standing at the
eye of C and so behave more fairly with A. Therefore, if
intermediaries are trusted both by the trustors and by the
trustees it is expected to generate higher levels of cooperation
and fairness.
When modelling intermediaries’ behaviour, for the sake
of simplicity we assumed that C could only choose between
two levels of fairness: providingAwith an accurate evaluation
of B (=high fairness) or sharing inaccurate or deceptive
information (=low fairness). Adapting Frey and Oberholzer-
Gee’s “motivation crowding-out” formalization [25], we also
assumed that each intermediary chooses a level of fairness (𝑓)
that maximizes his/her expected net benefit as follows:
max [𝑝 (𝑓) (𝑏 + 𝑒) + 𝑑 (𝑒, 𝑓) − 𝑘] . (2)
Since 𝑚 > 1, any increase of investments leads to higher
stakes to share and a higher level of fairness is beneficial
to everybody. In particular, 𝑏 indicates the expected benefit
for C due to the aggregate fairness, while 𝑒 indicates his/her
expected private earnings. Given that all these figures are
expected, the intermediaries’ benefits are weighted by the
probability 𝑝 to reach a given level of fairness 𝑓. The more C
plays fair the more he/she contributes to providing a context
for fairness (𝑝󸀠
𝑓
> 0).
It is worth noting that a crucial component of the model
is the intrinsic motivation of subjects (𝑑). This is expected
to increase with the overall level of fairness (𝑑󸀠
𝑓
> 0) and
to decline with private material earnings due to crowding-
out effects (𝑑󸀠
𝑒
< 0). Finally, we assumed that a fixed small
but strictly positive cost 𝑘 of fair behaviour existed due
the cognitive requirements by C (e.g., information search,
memory, and time) to perform a thoughtful evaluation of B.
Assuming that intermediaries choose the level of fairness
𝑓
∗ maximising their expected benefit, we derived the first
order condition as follows:
𝑝
󸀠
𝑓
(𝑏 + 𝑒) + 𝑑
󸀠
𝑓
= 0. (3)
It is important to note that intermediaries could see
a benefit 𝑏 from higher levels of fairness only if they are
expected to play as A or B in the future, that is, if roles are
rotating. If roles are fixed, 𝑏 = 0 and the intermediary’s
decision depends only on the personal earnings 𝑒 and the
intrinsic motivation 𝑑. Given (3), ceteris paribus a situation
where 𝑏 = 0 is expected to lead to a lower 𝑓∗ than where
intermediaries can derive benefits from the aggregate level of
fairness by playing other roles in the future.
It is worth noting that this can be framed in terms of
indirect reciprocity [23, 26, 27]. That is the idea of benefiting
unknown trustors by punishing self-interested trustees to
keep the fairness standards high and benefit from the reci-
procity of other reliable intermediaries when cast as trustors
(i.e., 𝑏 > 0).This can induce intermediaries to provide reliable
information and investors to trust reputational information.
This concatenation of strategies cannot work in a system
where interaction roles are fixed, given that intermediaries
cannot expect benefits from their evaluation as future trustors
(i.e., 𝑏 = 0). In this case, trustors cannot expect that
intermediaries provide a careful evaluation.
This led us to formulate our first hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 1. If roles of the interaction are fixed, indirect
reciprocitymotives cannotmotivate positive behaviour by the
parties involved, who will not see future benefits in keeping
the levels of fairness high.This implies that ceteris paribus the
fixed role condition will decrease fairness and cooperation.
The situation is different when the interests of interme-
diaries and trustors are aligned. In this case, intermediaries
receive a direct payoff 𝑒 > 0 by behaving fair. Indeed,
this interest alignment transforms the trust relationship in a
typical principal-agent model, where the intermediary (the
agent) can behave in the interest of the trustor (the principal).
In this case, the rational choice theory predicts that monetary
incentives are crucial to motivate the intermediary to act on
the trustor’s behalf, by guaranteeing that the self-interest of
the former coincides with the objectives of the latter [28].
The fact that the negative effect of monetary incentives on
intrinsic motivations (𝑑󸀠
𝑒
< 0) could be compensated by
higher levels of fairness (𝑑󸀠
𝑓
> 0) will lead to higher levels
of fairness and cooperation compared to the 𝑒 = 0 case.
This led us to formulate our second hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 2. If the intermediary responds to monetary
incentives that are aligned with the trustor’s interests, higher
levels of fairness will lead to higher cooperation in the system.
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In the symmetric case, where monetary incentives are
aligned with the trustee’s interests, intermediaries will receive
a personal payoff from being unfair. Note also that, in
this case, not only do the incentives crowd out intrinsic
motivations but also𝑑declines due to expected lower levels of
fairness.This is why the intermediary is in a potential conflict
of interest as he/she may be tempted to cheat the trustor by
providing opinions that benefit the trustee. Knowing this,
the trustor could be induced to question the reliability of
the intermediary’s opinion and decide not to enter into the
exchange or reduce his/her investment tominimal levels.This
is expected to erode the basis of cooperation.
This led us to formulate our third hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 3. When the intermediary’s incentives are aligned
with the trustee’s interests the levels of fairness will decline,
leading to lower cooperation in the system in comparison
with the situation where no monetary incentives exist.
A particular case is when intermediaries receive mon-
etary incentives that are independent of their actions and
the level of fairness in the system, as in the case of fixed
rewards. In this case, 𝑒 will not enter the benefit calculus as
expressed by the first term of (2) as it will be earned in all
cases, while the incentive will decrease the intermediaries’
intrinsic motivation because of 𝑑󸀠
𝑒
< 0, leading to low levels
of fairness. This will make the intermediary’s opinion poorly
credible for both the trustor and the trustee.
This led us to formulate our fourth hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 4. With intermediary’s incentives that are fixed
and independent from the interests of both the trustor and the
trustee, the levels of fairness and cooperation in the system
will be lower than in case of no monetary incentives.
Without any material interest in the exchange (𝑒 = 0),
intermediaries intrinsic motivations are expected to increase
with 𝑓. As long as roles change over time, being 𝑏 > 0
and 𝑝󸀠
𝑓
> 0, subjects are expected to personally benefit
from higher levels of fairness in the system. Furthermore, the
absence ofmonetary incentives can transform the interaction
into a moral problem, with intermediaries induced to punish
misbehaviour by trustees even more than in other incentive
schemes [29, 30].
This led us to formulate our last hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 5. With alternating roles and without monetary
incentives for intermediaries, fairness will increase leading to
high levels of cooperation in the system.
3. Methods
To test our hypotheses, we built two experiments based
on a modified version of the repeated investment game
described above with 𝑑A = 𝑑B = 10MU and 𝑚 = 3 and
with the restriction of choices to integer amounts (see the
Appendix for a detailed description of the experiments). We
extended the original dyadic game towards a third-party
game where we introduced intermediaries (Players C) not
directly involved in the transaction but asked to rate trustees’
behaviour (Players B) for the benefit of the trustors (Players
A). The opinion of Players C was formulated individually
and was shared with both Players A and B involved in the
exchange. When selected as a C Player, the subject was
matched with one Player A and one Player B and privately
informed of the amount received and returned by the latter
in the previous period. Then, he/she was asked to rate Player
B’s behaviour as “negative,” “neutral,” or “positive.” His/her
opinion was privately displayed to Player A before his/her
investment decision. The rest of the game worked as the
standard dyadic version described above. Note that any
communication between subjects was forbidden and subjects
played anonymously with possible partners from a large pool
of subjects.
In the first experiment, game roles (i.e., trustor, trustee,
and intermediary) alternated regularly throughout the game,
with the same subject playing the same number of times
in the three roles with randomly determined partners [11].
The second experiment followed the same design except that
roles were fixed throughout the game.The aim of this second
experiment was to rule out any (indirect) reciprocity motive
from the intermediary behaviour, as the intermediary now
could not provide reliable information to expect good future
information in turn (in the trustor’s role).
More specifically, in both experiments, monetary incen-
tives for intermediaries systematically varied across treat-
ments according to our hypotheses. In the No incentive
treatment, intermediaries did not receive any rewards for
their task, also losing potential earnings as trustors or trustees
when selected to play in this role. In the Fixed incentive
treatment, intermediaries received a fixed payoff of 10MU,
equal to the trustor and trustee endowments. In the A
incentive treatment, intermediaries earningswere equal to the
payoff obtained by the trustors they advised. In the B incentive
treatment, intermediaries’ earnings were equal to the payoff
obtained by the trustees they rated.
4. Results
4.1. Experiment 1 (Alternating Roles). Our experiment pro-
duced investments and returns comparable to previous
experiments in the Baseline [18] and, consistent with previ-
ous studies which introduced reputational motives [9, 22],
showed that the presence of the intermediaries dramatically
improved cooperation.
A total of 136 subjects (50% female) participated in the
experiment, held in late 2010. Both investments and returns
were higher when intermediaries were introduced, with
investments increasing from an average of 3.22MU in the
Baseline up to 5.21MU in A incentive and returns rising from
2.00 in the Baseline to 6.87 in No incentive (Figure 1). (Our
dataset may be accessed upon request to the corresponding
author. All statistical analyses were performed using the 𝑅
2.15.1 platform [31]. Please, note that the amounts exchanged
in the first three periods of the game, when intermediaries
had no previous information to evaluate, and in the last three
periods, when trustees knew that no further ratingwould take
place, were not included in the analysis.)
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Figure 1: Experiment 2 results. Average investments, returns, and CI by treatment. Bars show the standard error of the means.
Differences with the Baseline for both investments and
returns were significant at the 5% level for all treatments
except Fixed incentive, where the difference was significant
only for returns. Significant differences also existed for Player
B returns. Both No incentive and A incentive led to higher
returns than Fixed incentive (Wilcoxon rank sum tests on
individual averages, 𝑊 = 531.0, 𝑃 = 0.002 one tailed, and
𝑊 = 199.0, 𝑃 = 0.002 one tailed, resp.). There were no
significant differences between No incentive and A incentive
(𝑊 = 385.0, 𝑃 = 0.365). Differences in investments were not
considerable but still statistically significant at 5%betweenNo
incentive and Fixed incentive (𝑊 = 508.0, 𝑃 = 0.006 one
tailed) and between A incentive and Fixed incentive (𝑊 =
176.5, 𝑃 = 0.001 one tailed).
To compare the outcome of the different treatments bet-
ter, we built an indicator that considered both social welfare
and fairness, which are two aspects strictly linked with coop-
eration due to the social dilemma nature of the investment
game [32]. Indeed, in any investment game, trust is a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, it includes trustors who are
better-off by placing trust and so can increase the welfare of
the system by taking the risk of interaction. On the other
hand, it also includes trustees who can act in a more or
less trustworthy way, so contributing to giving rise to a
fair exchange. Following [11], in order to look at these two
sides of the this process, we built an index that combined
attention to the social welfare, which only depended on A
investments, and fairness, which depended on B returns,
which we called cooperation index (CI). The level of social
welfare is an important indicator of the system efficiency
in the different treatments. This is indicated by 𝐸 = 𝐼/𝑑A,
where 𝐼 was A investment and 𝑑A was the endowment. This
indicator took 0 when A invested nothing and 1 when A
invested the whole endowment. Following previous research
[33–36], fairness was calculated by comparing the difference
in the payoffs to the sum of monetary gains: 𝐹 = 1 − [|𝑃A −
𝑃B|/(𝑃A +𝑃B)], where 𝑃A and 𝑃B were the payoffs earned by A
and B Players, respectively.This was 0when one of the players
obtained the whole amount at stake and the other received
nothing, while it was 1 when both players obtained the same
payoff. Note that no trade-off exists between maximising 𝐸
and𝐹, given that, for any level of investment (including zero),
only the amount returned determined the fairness payoff.The
cooperation index was defined as CI = (𝐸 + 𝐹)/2. This was
0 when A Players invested nothing and B Players returned
all their endowments, grew with the growth of A investments
and a fairer distribution of final payoffs, and became 1 whenA
Players invested 𝑑A and B Players returned half of their total
endowment, that is, (𝑑B + 𝑚𝐼)/2.
The treatmentwith the highest CIwasNo incentive, which
led to more fairness than any other treatment (Figure 1).
Differences in the CI were statistically significant at 10% with
A incentive and at 5% with all other treatments. The high
CI value in No incentive was especially important as in this
case, unlike A incentive, intermediaries had no monetary
incentive to cooperate with trustors.This would confirm that
the lack of monetary incentives for intermediaries implied
higher normative standards of behaviour for the other actors
involved.
4.2. Experiment 2 (Fixed Roles). A total of 244 subjects (55%
females) participated in the second experiment, which was
organized in 2011. Results showed that trust and trustwor-
thiness were generally lower than in the first experiment.
Average investments ranged from 2.36MU in Fixed incentive
to 3.96MU in A incentive. Returns ranged from 2.47MU in
Fixed incentive to 5.27MU in A incentive. The cooperation
index ranged from 0.507MU in the Baseline to 0.557MU in
A incentive (Figure 2).
The only treatment leading to investments significantly
higher than the Baseline was A incentive (𝑊 = 82, 𝑃 = 0.049
one tailed), while returnswere significantly higher (at the 10%
level) in both A incentive and B incentive (𝑊 = 88, 𝑃 = 0.071
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Figure 2: Experiment 2 results. Average investments, returns, and CI by treatment. Bars show the standard error of the means.
one tailed for both treatments). Finally, the cooperation index
was significantly higher than the Baseline in No incentive
(𝑊 = 351, 𝑃 = 0.019 one tailed), A incentive (𝑊 = 299,
𝑃 = 0.003 one tailed) and B incentive (𝑊 = 312, 𝑃 = 0.004),
but not in Fixed incentive (𝑊 = 462, 𝑃 = 0.288 one tailed).
4.3. Comparing the Two Experiments. A comparison between
alternating versus fixed role treatments highlighted the effects
of indirect reciprocity (Table 1). Besides lower returns in
the Baseline—a result consistent with the existing literature
[18]—investments and returns were generally higher in the
alternating roles experiment. This difference was especially
relevant in No incentive. This was one of the best performing
treatments in the first experiment, while, in fixed role treat-
ments, investments and returns were similar to the Baseline
(i.e., without intermediaries). On the other hand, the two
treatments with sound monetary incentives led to a more
modest decrease in investment and especially, in returns.
Note also that B incentive performed similarly in the two
experiments.
In order to examine the effect of the different factors
involved in the exchange, we estimated a random effects
model using dummies indicating the fixed role experi-
ment, each treatment, the first and the last period, and
the second half of the game as regressors (Table 2). Due
to the considerable interdependence between the observed
decisions, random effects (multilevel) regression analysis was
performed that considered the nestedness of observations at
the individual level. Results showed that fixed roles caused an
overall decrease of trust but had less effect on trustworthiness.
A incentive had a stronger impact on trustee behaviour, while
No incentive had a stronger impact on CI, that is, on the
fairness of the exchange. All conditions except Fixed incen-
tives led to higher trust and trustworthiness than the Baseline.
Finally, all cooperation indicators declined during the game,
confirming the typical “end effect” found in previous studies
[9, 22, 37].
If we consider the behaviour of the intermediaries, we
can see that they generally played fairly, asking B Players
to return significantly more to award a more positive rating
(Table 3(a)). They were more demanding where trust was
higher, namely, inNo incentive andA incentive of the alternat-
ing roles experiment. In both cases, to award a positive rating
to trustees, intermediaries asked trustees to return about one-
third of the trustees’ endowments. On the other hand, in less
cooperative treatments such asNo incentive or Fixed incentive
in the fixed roles experiment, they were less demanding (i.e.,
to one-sixth and even less). Moreover, negative ratings were
more frequent in the most cooperative treatments. Although
only descriptive, these results suggest that a more rigorous
reputation process took place in these conditions, despite the
overall higher trustworthiness of trustees achieved in these
treatments (Table 3(b)).
It is also important to note that trustor investments
reflected the behaviour of the intermediary. Generally,
trustors invested more when their opponents received pos-
itive ratings, less in cases of neutral ratings and even less
in cases of negative ratings (Table 4). It is worth noting
that also in this case there were no important differences
across treatments. Results suggest that trustors trusted inter-
mediaries more when the latter gave positive ratings in No
incentives and A incentive in the alternating roles experiment.
In these cases, they invested on average 6.25MUand 7.04MU,
respectively.They invested less in treatments where there was
low trust, such as Fixed incentive in the fixed role condition,
where average investment of trustors was 2.43MU evenwhen
trustees had a positive rating.
5. Discussion
Our experiments have highlighted the crucial role of inde-
pendent judges in trust situations, even when their opinions
could be viewed as subjective and/or without serious long-
term future consequences for the trustee. We found that,
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Table 1: Overview of Experiments 1 and 2 results. The AR/FR column presents the ratio between the corresponding results in the alternating
and the fixed role experiment. The last two columns present Wilcoxon rank sum tests of the null hypothesis that the result distribution is the
same in the two experiments.
Treatment Altern. roles Fixed roles AR/FR Wilcoxon
Mean SE Mean SE 𝑊 𝑃
Baseline
A investments 3.22 0.16 3.07 0.16 1.05 207.5 0.385
B returns 2.00 0.16 3.54 0.26 0.56 142.5 0.079
B ret. (prop.) 0.09 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.56 137.0 0.059
CI 0.50 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.98 319.0 0.118
No incentive
A investments 5.07 0.23 3.47 0.12 1.46 174.0 0.029
B returns 6.87 0.42 3.24 0.16 2.12 196.0 0.003
B ret. (prop.) 0.24 0.01 0.14 0.01 1.71 189.0 0.006
CI 0.63 0.01 0.54 0.00 1.17 396.0 0.000
Fixed inc.
A investments 3.61 0.21 2.36 0.11 1.53 170.0 0.040
B returns 3.75 0.30 2.47 0.15 1.52 142.0 0.232
B ret. (prop.) 0.17 0.01 0.10 0.01 1.70 150.0 0.153
CI 0.54 0.01 0.52 0.00 1.04 264.0 0.319
A incentive
A investments 5.21 0.21 3.96 0.14 1.32 174.5 0.028
B returns 6.42 0.45 5.27 0.27 1.22 147.0 0.180
B ret. (prop.) 0.23 0.01 0.21 0.01 1.10 134.0 0.333
CI 0.60 0.01 0.56 0.01 1.07 365.0 0.002
B incentive
A investments 4.50 0.18 3.68 0.14 1.22 154.0 0.121
B returns 4.75 0.28 4.07 0.19 1.17 141.5 0.238
B ret. (prop.) 0.19 0.01 0.18 0.01 1.06 130.0 0.387
CI 0.58 0.01 0.55 0.00 1.05 307.0 0.071
Table 2:Multilevel regression analysiswith individual-level random
effects. Significance codes: ∗∗∗𝑃 < 0.001, ∗∗𝑃 < 0.01, ∗𝑃 < 0.05,
†
𝑃 < 0.1.
Dependent Investments Returns CI
(Intercept) 3.607∗∗∗ 0.154 0.516∗∗∗
Fixed roles −0.962∗∗∗ −0.133 −0.030∗∗∗
No incentive 1.339∗∗ 1.509∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
Fixed incentive 0.040 0.684 0.030∗
A incentive 1.538∗∗∗ 2.004∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
B incentive 1.075∗∗ 1.012† 0.066∗∗∗
First period 0.066 0.954∗∗∗ 0.024∗
Last period −0.562∗∗ −0.848∗∗ −0.031∗∗
Periods 16–30 −0.313∗∗∗ −0.420∗∗∗ −0.010∗
A investment 0.853∗∗∗
Random effects
𝜎 (id) 1.827 2.553 0.054
𝜎 (residual) 2.314 2.971 0.118
Number of interactions 4070 4070 4070
Number of individuals 222 222 222
𝐹 21.5
∗∗∗
320.7
∗∗∗
121.1
∗∗∗
somewhat counterintuitively, the intermediary’s opinions had
a stronger effect when the intermediary had no material
interest from the exchange. If there was room for indirect
reciprocity between the parties involved, triadic relationships
could provide a moral base to overcome the negative traps
of self-interest. We also found that monetary incentives and
moral action were not clearly separable or substitutes [38].
If properly designed, monetary incentives for intermediaries
had a positive effect, especially on trustor’s investments,
but were less effective than social norms and reciprocity in
ensuring fair exchanges in terms of more equal distribution
of payoffs between trustors and trustees.
First, the “shadow of reciprocity” implied that interme-
diaries kept the standards of evaluation high to benefit good
information in turn by other intermediaries, when acting as
trustors. This in turn induced trustees to be more reliable.
Under evaluation, trustees overestimated the future impact
of their good standing and behaved more fairly. On the other
hand, having information about trustee behaviour induced
trustors to predict higher cooperative responses by trustees
and increase their investment. It is worth noting that recent
work showed that thismechanism is relatively independent of
the quality of information. For instance, in an experiment on
financial decisions in situations of uncertainty and informa-
tion asymmetry similar to our experiment, [39] showed that
the availability of information from other subjects increased
risky trust investment decisions of subjects independent of
the quality of the information.
It is worth noting that the motivation crowding-out
model (2) was able to match our empirical data qualitatively.
Coherently with H1, the comparison of the two experiments
confirmed the paramount importance of indirect reciprocity
motives in trust situations.The idea that indirect reciprocity is
fundamental in human societies has been suggested by [40],
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Table 3: Summary statistics by rating. Average return proportion
by rating (a) and rating distribution per treatment (b). AR stands
for “alternating roles” and FR for “fixed roles.”
(a) Return proportion
Treatment Negative Neutral Positive
No incentive AR 0.14 0.22 0.34
No incentive FR 0.13 0.15 0.14
Fixed incentive AR 0.08 0.16 0.24
Fixed incentive FR 0.11 0.09 0.17
A incentive AR 0.15 0.22 0.33
A incentive FR 0.18 0.16 0.28
B incentive AR 0.14 0.20 0.22
B incentive FR 0.19 0.15 0.18
All treatments 0.15 0.16 0.22
(b) Rating distribution
Treatment Negative Neutral Positive
No incentive AR 0.42 0.22 0.36
No incentive FR 0.37 0.26 0.37
Fixed incentive AR 0.34 0.31 0.35
Fixed incentive FR 0.36 0.30 0.34
A incentive AR 0.41 0.25 0.35
A incentive FR 0.37 0.23 0.40
B incentive AR 0.33 0.29 0.38
B incentive FR 0.33 0.22 0.44
All treatments 0.36 0.26 0.38
Table 4: Average investments by treatment and rating.
Treatment Negative Neutral Positive
No incentive AR 3.72 5.76 6.25
No incentive FR 2.39 3.24 4.62
Fixed incentive AR 1.84 4.05 4.81
Fixed incentive FR 2.18 2.44 2.43
A incentive AR 3.43 5.02 7.04
A incentive FR 2.75 4.46 4.71
B incentive AR 3.39 4.52 5.27
B incentive FR 2.79 4.00 4.10
All treatments 2.72 3.87 4.56
who argued that this is one of the most crucial forces in
human evolution. This has been found in different experi-
mental settings [21, 23]. Our experiments suggest that, ceteris
paribus, indirect reciprocity explains a significant part of
cooperation also in triadic relations (Tables 1 and 2). This
indicates that evaluation systems where the roles of trustors,
trustees, and evaluators rotate could work better and more
efficiently than those in which roles are fixed.
H2 was also confirmed by our data. In both experiments
A incentive guaranteed high levels of cooperation as inter-
mediary evaluations fostered both investments by trustors
and returns by trustees. In this treatment, trustees followed
reputation building strategies and so returned more. Fur-
thermore, trustors considered the opinions of intermediaries
credible and used them to discriminate between “good” and
“bad” opponents. Therefore, intermediaries were functional
to encapsulate mutual trust and cooperation.
H3 was the only hypothesis not fully supported by our
data. On the one hand, B incentive led to less cooperation than
A incentive. On the other hand, B incentive unexpectedly gave
better results than the Baseline, as intermediaries were less
demanding than in A incentive to award positive ratings but
still discriminated between trustworthy and untrustworthy
B Players (Table 3). This induced trustors to consider the
opinion of reliable intermediaries and followed their ratings
independent of the misalignment of mutual interests caused
by the monetary incentives (Table 4). This would again
confirm that, in condition of information asymmetry, any
information on trustee is better than none, as in the Baseline.
The mismatch between monetary incentives and inter-
mediary’s behaviour is interesting. Results indicated that
intermediaries did not predictably respond to incentives as
they played fairly in each treatment (Table 3). This can be
explained in terms of intrinsic motivations and the sense of
responsibility that are typically associated with such “neutral”
positions.More specifically, it is worth noting that willingness
to provide pertinent judgement by intermediaries was not
sensitive to any variations in the incentive scheme. This
would testify to the inherent moral dimension of this role.
On the other hand, even the perception that their task
was indirectly judged by the trustors, who were informed
of their ratings, could have motivated the intermediaries
to take their role seriously, independent of the incentives.
More importantly, the alternating roles protocol allowed
intermediaries to follow indirect reciprocity strategies and
so they kept the credibility and quality of their ratings high
in order to benefit from reciprocity by other intermediaries
when cast as trustors. This explains the difference between
the two experiments.
Consistent with H4, Fixed incentive led to less coopera-
tion than other schemes. A comparison betweenNo incentive
and Fixed incentive allows us to understand this point better.
In the alternating roles experiment, while No incentive led to
more trust and cooperation, Fixed incentive barely improved
the Baseline, that is, when intermediaries were not present.
This does not make sense in a rational choice perspec-
tive, as in both cases the incentives of intermediaries were
ambiguous. On the other hand, while intrinsic motivations
were crucial to induce intermediaries to formulate reliable
ratings in No incentive, these aspects were crowded out by
monetary incentives in Fixed incentive. This is consistent
with the motivation crowding theory [25, 41] and with many
empirical studies that showed that incentivization policies
which targeted self-interested individuals actually backfire
by undermining individual “moral sentiments” in a variety
of social and economic situations [29, 38]. In this sense,
some possible extensions of our work could examine the
relationship between crowding out effects on social norms
and the presence of different incentive schemes in more
detail. For instance, it would be interesting to understand
if different incentives for the intermediaries could influence
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future interactions between trustors and trustees without
intermediaries. This could also help us to look at self-rein-
forcing effects of incentives and social norms on trust.
It is worth considering that more consistent monetary
incentives for intermediaries could increase their credibility
for the other parties involved, so motivating more coopera-
tion. Indeed, a possible explanation of the low cooperation
in Fixed incentive is that the magnitude of our monetary
incentives was sufficient to crowd out intrinsic motives of
subjects without promoting reciprocal and self-interested
behaviour, as what happened in typical monetary markets
[29]. Further work is necessary to examine this hypothesis
by testing fixed incentives of different magnitudes, although
it is worth considering that there are constraints in terms of
magnitude of incentives that can be implemented also in real
situations.
H5 was also confirmed by our results, at least in the alter-
nating roles experiment. In this case, No incentive was the
best treatment for cooperation. On the other hand, it did
not promote trust and especially, trustworthiness when roles
were fixed. As argued above, by fixing the roles, there was
no room for indirect reciprocity strategies. The fact that
intermediaries could expect future benefits from their roles
and were subsequently cast as both trustors and trustees
induced the parties involved to believemore in the credibility
of the intermediaries’ opinion. Also in this case, further
empirical investigation is needed to compare social situations
where intermediaries have a specialised role with situations
where there is voluntarism and mixture of roles.
These findings imply that the “mantra” of incentivization
popularized by most economists as a means to solve trust
and cooperation problems, especially in economic and public
policy, should be seriously reconsidered [42]. Not only should
incentives be properly designed to produce predictable out-
comes and this is often difficult, but also incentive-response
behaviour of individuals is more heterogeneous and unpre-
dictable than expected [43]. If this occurred in a simple
laboratory game, where individuals had perfect information
and the rules of the game were fully intelligible, one should
expect even more heterogeneity of individual behaviour and
unpredictability of social outcomes in real situations.
Our results finally suggest that insisting on incentiviza-
tion potentially crowds out other social norms-friendly,
endogenous mechanisms such as reputation, which could
ensure socially and economically consistent results. While
incentives might induce higher investment risks (but only if
properly designed), social norms can also help to achieve a
fairer distribution, nurturing good behaviour which can be
even more endogenously sustainable in the long run [44].
Appendices
A. Details of the Experiment Organization
All participants were recruited using the online system
ORSEE [45].Theywere fully informed and gave their consent
when they voluntarily registered on ORSEE. Data collection
fully complied with Italian law on personal data protection
(D.L. 30/6/2003, n. 196). Under the applicable legal principles
on healthy volunteers’ registries, the study did not require
ethical committee approval. All interactionswere anonymous
and took place through a computer network equipped with
the experimental software z-Tree [46].
Experiment 1 (Alternating Roles). A total of 136 subjects (50%
female) participated in the experiment held at the GECS
experimental lab (see http://www.eco.unibs.it/gecs/) in the
late 2010. Each experimental session took less than one hour
and participants earned, on average, 14.82 Euro, including a
5-Euro show-up fee.
Twenty-eight subjects participated in a Baseline repeated
investment game (hereafter Baseline) set using the following
parameters: 𝑑A = 𝑑B = 10 monetary units (MU), 𝑚 = 3.
EachMUwas worth 2.5 Euro Cents and subjects were paid in
cash immediately at the end of the experiment.The game was
repeated 30 timeswith coupleswhowere randomly reshuffled
in each period. Players’ roles regularly alternated throughout
the game.Thismeant that each subject played exactly 15 times
as A and 15 times as B.
All the other treatments, each played by 27 subjects,
introduced a third player into the game (Player C) in the
role of intermediary. Once C Players were introduced, we
varied the monetary incentive schemes offered to them. In
the No incentive treatment, intermediaries did not receive
any rewards for their task, also losing potential earnings as
trustors or trustees when selected to play in this role. In
the Fixed incentive treatment, intermediaries received a fixed
payoff of 10MU, equal to the trustor and trustee endowments.
In the A incentive treatment, intermediaries earnings were
equal to the payoff obtained by the trustors they advised. In
the B incentive treatment, intermediaries’ earnings were equal
to the payoff obtained by the trustees they rated.
Experiment 2 (Fixed Roles). A total of 244 subjects (55%
female) participated in the second experiment, which was
organized at the GECS experimental lab in the late 2011.
Participants were recruited and played as in the first exper-
iment. Each experimental session took less than one hour
and participants earned, on average, 14.78 Euro, including a
5-Euro show-up fee.
Any overlap with the first experiment participants was
avoided, so that the two experiments could in principle be
viewed as a single experiment with a between-subject design.
The treatments were as before, with the only difference that
roles remained fixed throughout the game. Note that the fact
that roles no longer alternated actually reduced the sample
of observations per role, with a considerable consequence
especially on the treatments involving three parties (i.e., all
but the Baseline). To overcome this problem, we doubled
the number of subjects participating in No incentive, Fixed
incentive, A incentive, and B incentive, which were played
by 54 subjects each, organized in two sessions, each one
involving 27 participants.
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B. Instructions
Before the beginning of the game, participants read the game
instruction on their computer screen. Subsequently, they
filled a short test designed to check their understanding of
the game. Participants could also ask the experimenters any
further questions or issues. Here is the English translation
of the original Italian instructions. Sentences in italics are
treatment or experiment specific, whereas a normal font is
used for instructions common to all treatments/experiments.
Screen 1: Overall Information on the Experiment
(i) All these instructions contain true information and
are the same for all participants.
(ii) Please, read them very carefully. At the end, some
questions will be asked by the system to test your
understanding of the experiment.
(iii) The experiment concerns economic problems.
(iv) During the experiment, youwill be asked to take deci-
sions, upon which your final earnings will depend.
Earnings will be paid in cash at the end of the experi-
ment.
(v) Each decision will take place through your computer
screen.
(vi) During the experiment, it is prohibited to talk with
anyone. If you do so, you will be excluded from the
experiment and you will lose your earnings. Please,
turn your mobile phones off.
(vii) For any information and question, put your hands up
and wait until an experimenter comes to your posi-
tion.
(viii) During the experiment, virtual monetary units (MU)
are used that have a fixed exchange rate with real
Euros. For each MU earned in the experiment, you
will receive 2.5 Euro Cents. For example, if at the end
of the experiment, your earning is 500MU, thismeans
that you will receive 12.50 Euros, plus a fixed show-up
fee of 5 Euros.
Screen 2: Interaction Rules
(i) The experiment consists of a sequence of interaction
rounds between pairs of players (Baseline).
(ii) The experiment consists of a sequence of interaction
rounds between groups of three players (all three
person treatments).
(iii) Pairs are randomly matched and change each round;
therefore, they are made up of different individuals
each round (Baseline).
(iv) Groups are randomly matched and change each
round; therefore, they are made up of different indi-
viduals each round (all three person treatments).
(v) There is no way to know who you are playing with,
nor is it possible to communicate with her/him.
(vi) In each pair, each participant will perform a different
role; roles are called “Player A” and “Player B” (Base-
line).
(vii) In each group, each participant will perform a differ-
ent role; roles are called “Player A,” “Player B,” and
“Player C” (all three person treatments).
(viii) Roles are randomly assigned at the beginning of the
experiment and then regularly changed for the rest of
it. For example, one participant in the pair will play a
sequence of rounds such as Player A, Player B, Player
A, Player B, Player A, and Player B, and the other one
will play a sequence such as Player B, Player A, Player
B, Player A, Player B, and Player A.Therefore, over the
experiment, all participants will play both roles the
same number of rounds (alternating roles experiment,
Baseline).
(ix) Roles are randomly assigned at the beginning of the
experiment and then regularly changed for the rest of
it. For example, one participant in the group will play
a sequence of rounds such as PlayerA, Player B, Player
C, Player A, Player B, and Player C, and another one
will play a sequence such as Player B, Player C, Player
A, Player B, Player C, and Player A. Therefore, over
the experiment, all participants will play all roles the
same number of rounds (alternating roles experiment,
all three person treatments).
(x) Roles are randomly assigned at the beginning of the
experiment.Thismeans that each participantwill play
in the same role throughout the whole experiment
(fixed roles experiment, all treatments).
(xi) Each participant should make one decision each
round.
(xii) The experiment lasts 30 rounds.
Screen 3: Task Structure
(i) Player A plays first and receives an endowment of
10MU. She/he has to decide howmuchof it to keep for
her/himself and howmuch to send to Player B. Player
A can send to Player B any amount, from 0MU to the
whole endowment (=10MU).
(ii) The amount of MU kept by Player A is part of her/his
earning.The amount of MU sent to Player B is tripled
and assigned to Player B.
(iii) Player B also receives an endowment of 10MU, as
Player A did.
(iv) Example 1: if Player A sends 2MU, Player B receives 2
× 3 + 10 = 16MU.
(v) Example 2: if Player A sends 5MU, Player B receives
5 × 3 + 10 = 25MU.
(vi) Example 3: if Player A sends 8MU, Player B receives
8 × 3 + 10 = 34MU.
(vii) Player B should decide how much of the whole
amount received to send to Player A; Player B can
send any amount to Player A from 0MU to the entire
sum.
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(viii) The amount ofMUkept by Player B represents her/his
earning; the amount of MU sent to Player A will add
up to Player A earning.
(ix) Before A and B players, respectively, take their deci-
sions, Player C is asked to rate the decision Player B
took the previous round (since no decision has been
taken by B in the first round yet, C is not asked to rate
in the first round) (all three person treatments).
(x) Player C can rate Player B’s decision as “negative,”
“neutral,” or “positive” and the rating is communi-
cated to both A and B Players with whom he/she is
grouped (in the first rounds, since there is no decision
undertaken by Player B yet, the rating of Player B is
assigned by the systemas “unknown”) (all three person
treatments).
(xi) Player C does not receive any earnings for her/his
action (No incentive treatments).
(xii) Player C earning is fixed and is equal to 10MU (Fixed
incentive treatments).
(xiii) Player C earning is equal to what Player A will earn at
the end of the round (A incentive treatments).
(xiv) Player C earning is equal to what Player B will earn at
the end of the round (B incentive treatments).
(xv) Earnings will be added up each round to give the final
reward for each participant, which will be paid at the
end of the experiment.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare that there is no conflict of interests
regarding the publication of this paper.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge comments
on a preliminary version of this paper by Karl-Dieter Opp,
Gianluca Carnabuci, Michael Maes, and the audience at
the INAS Conference on Analytical Sociology, Columbia
University, New York, 8-9 June, 2012, and at the ASA 2012
Annual Meeting, Denver, 17–20 August, 2012. They also
would like to thankMarco Castellani and Niccolo` Casnici for
help during the experiment and Fabio Recinella for technical
assistance in the lab.This work was supported by the Collegio
Carlo Alberto and the University of Brescia. The authors
also gratefully acknowledge support from the Intra-European
Fellowship Program of the European Union (Grant no. GA-
2009-236953).
References
[1] J. S. Coleman, Foundations of SocialTheory, Harvard University
Press, Harvard, Mass, USA, 1990.
[2] R. S. Burt and M. Knez, “Kinds of third-party effects on trust,”
Rationality and Society, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 255–292, 1995.
[3] K. S. Cookm and R. Hardin, “Norms of cooperativeness and
networks of trust,” in Social Norms, M. Hechter and K.-D. Opp,
Eds., pp. 327–347, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, NY, USA,
2001.
[4] M. Bateson, D. Nettle, and G. Roberts, “Cues of being watched
enhance cooperation in a real-world setting,” Biology Letters,
vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 412–414, 2006.
[5] I. Bohnet and B. S. Frey, “The sound of silence in prisoner’s
dilemma and dictator games,” Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 43–57, 1999.
[6] T. N. Cason and V.-L. Mui, “A laboratory study of group polar-
isation in the team dictator game,” Economic Journal, vol. 107,
no. 444, pp. 1465–1483, 1997.
[7] K. J.Haley andD.M.T. Fessler, “Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues
affect generosity an anonymous economic game,” Evolution and
Human Behavior, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 245–256, 2005.
[8] M. Rigdon, K. Ishii, M. Watabe, and S. Kitayama, “Minimal
social cues in the dictator game,” Journal of Economic Psychol-
ogy, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 358–367, 2009.
[9] R. Boero, G. Bravo, M. Castellani, and F. Squazzoni, “Reputa-
tional cues in repeated trust games,” Journal of Socio-Economics,
vol. 38, no. 6, pp. 871–877, 2009.
[10] M. Bacharach and D. Gambetta, “Trust in signs,” in Trust and
Society, K. S. Cook, Ed., vol. 2, pp. 148–184, Russell Sage, New
York, NY, USA, 2001.
[11] F. Squazzoni,G. Bravo, andK.Taka´cs, “Does incentive provision
increase the quality of peer review? An experimental study,”
Research Policy, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 287–294, 2013.
[12] K. Cook, R. Hardin, and M. Levi, Cooperation without Trust,
Russell Sage, New York, NY, USA, 2005.
[13] R. Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, Russell Sage, New York,
NY, USA, 2004.
[14] J. P. Bailey and Y. Bakos, “An exploratory study of the emerging
role of electronic intermediaries,” International Journal of Elec-
tronic Commerce, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 7–20, 1997.
[15] J.W. Palmer, J. P. Bailey, and S. Faraj, “The role of intermediaries
in the development of trust on the WWW: the use and
prominence of trusted third parties and privacy statements,”
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, vol. 5, no. 3,
2000.
[16] O. Sorenson and T. E. Stuart, “Syndication networks and the
spatial distribution of venture capital investments,” American
Journal of Sociology, vol. 106, no. 6, pp. 1546–1588, 2001.
[17] J. Berg, J. Dickhaut, and K. McCabe, “Trust, reciprocity and
social history,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 10, no. 1, pp.
122–142, 1995.
[18] N. D. Johnson and A. A. Mislin, “Trust games: a meta-analysis,”
Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 865–889, 2011.
[19] V. Buskens and W. Raub, “Rational choice research on social
dilemmas: embeddedness effects on trust,” in Handbook of
Rational Choice Social Research, R.Wittek, T. A. B. Snijders, and
V. Nee, Eds., Russell Sage, New York, NY, USA, 2008.
[20] V. Buskens, W. Raub, and J. van der Veer, “Trust in triads: an
experimental study,” Social Networks, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 301–312,
2010.
[21] E. Fehr and U. Fischbacher, “The nature of human altruism,”
Nature, vol. 425, no. 6960, pp. 785–791, 2003.
[22] C. Keser, “Experimental games for the design of reputation
management systems,” IBM Systems Journal, vol. 42, no. 3, pp.
498–506, 2003.
[23] I. Seinen and A. Schram, “Social status and group norms:
indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment,”European
Economic Review, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 581–602, 2006.
12 Journal of Applied Mathematics
[24] D. Barrera and G. G. Van De Bunt, “Learning to trust: networks
effects through time,” European Sociological Review, vol. 25, no.
6, pp. 709–721, 2009.
[25] B. S. Frey and F. Oberholzer-Gee, “The cost of price incentives:
an empirical analysis of motivation crowding- out,” American
Economic Review, vol. 87, no. 4, pp. 746–755, 1997.
[26] R.D.Alexander,TheBiology ofMoral Systems, Basic Books,New
York, NY, USA, 1987.
[27] M. A. Nowak and K. Sigmund, “The dynamics of indirect reci-
procity,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, vol. 194, no. 4, pp. 561–
574, 1998.
[28] J.-J. Laffont and D. Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The
Principal-Agent Model, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
NJ, USA, 2002.
[29] D. Ariely, A. Bracha, and S. Meier, “Doing good or doing well?
Image motivation and monetary incentives in behaving proso-
cially,” American Economic Review, vol. 99, no. 1, pp. 544–555,
2009.
[30] J. Heyman and D. Ariely, “Effort for payment: a tale of two
markets,” Psychological Science, vol. 15, no. 11, pp. 787–793, 2004.
[31] R Core Team, R: A Language and Environment for Statistical
Computing, R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna,
Austria, 2012.
[32] P. Kollock, “Social dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation,”
Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 24, pp. 182–214, 1998.
[33] I. Alma˚s, A. W. Cappelen, E. Ø. Sørensen, and B. Tungodden,
“Fairness and the development of inequality acceptance,” Sci-
ence, vol. 328, no. 5982, pp. 1176–1178, 2010.
[34] E. Fehr and K. M. Schmidt, “A theory of fairness, competition,
and cooperation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 114, no.
3, pp. 817–868, 1999.
[35] M. A. Nowak, K. M. Page, and K. Sigmund, “Fairness versus
reason in the ultimatum game,” Science, vol. 289, no. 5485, pp.
1773–1775, 2000.
[36] M. Rabin, “Incorporating fairness into game theory and eco-
nomics,” American Economic Review, vol. 83, pp. 1281–1302,
1993.
[37] F. Cochard, P. Nguyen Van, and M. Willinger, “Trusting behav-
ior in a repeated investment game,” Journal of Economic Behav-
ior and Organization, vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 31–44, 2004.
[38] S. Bowles, “Policies designed for self-interested citizens may
undermine “the moral sentiments”: evidence from economic
experiments,” Science, vol. 320, no. 5883, pp. 1605–1609, 2008.
[39] R. Boero, G. Bravo, M. Castellani, and F. Squazzoni, “Why
bother with what others tell you? An experimental data-driven
agent-based model,” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social
Simulation, vol. 13, no. 3, article 6, 2010.
[40] M. A. Nowak and R. Highfield, SuperCooperators: Altruism,
Evolution, and WhyWe Need Each Other to Succeed, Free Press,
New York, NY, USA, 2011.
[41] B. S. Frey and R. Jegen, “Motivation crowding theory,” Journal of
Economic Surveys, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 589–611, 2001.
[42] F. Squazzoni, “A social science-inspired complexity policy:
beyond the mantra of incentivization,” Complexity, vol. 19, pp.
5–13, 2014.
[43] E. Shafir,The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA, 2013.
[44] S. Bowles and S. Polanı´a-Reyes, “Economic incentives and
social preferences: substitutes or complements?” Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 368–425, 2012.
[45] B. Greiner, “An online recruitment system for economic exper-
iments,” in Forschung und Wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003, K.
Kremer and V. Macho, Eds., pp. 79–93, Gesellschaft fu¨r wis-
senschaftliche Datenverarbeitung, Go¨ttingen, Germany, 2004.
[46] U. Fischbacher, “Z-Tree: zurich toolbox for ready-made eco-
nomic experiments,” Experimental Economics, vol. 10, no. 2, pp.
171–178, 2007.
Submit your manuscripts at
http://www.hindawi.com
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Mathematics
Journal of
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Mathematical Problems 
in Engineering
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com
Differential Equations
International Journal of
Volume 2014
Applied Mathematics
Journal of
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Probability and Statistics
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Journal of
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Mathematical Physics
Advances in
Complex Analysis
Journal of
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Optimization
Journal of
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Combinatorics
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
International Journal of
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Operations Research
Advances in
Journal of
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Function Spaces
Abstract and 
Applied Analysis
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
International 
Journal of 
Mathematics and 
Mathematical 
Sciences
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
The Scientific 
World Journal
Hindawi Publishing Corporation 
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Algebra
Discrete Dynamics in 
Nature and Society
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Decision Sciences
Advances in
Discrete Mathematics
Journal of
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com
Volume 2014 Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Stochastic Analysis
International Journal of
